|
|
Interview: Joshua Holst by Christoph
Writer and director Joshua Holst’s career shows a broad understanding for human rights and environment causes. He holds a B.A. from Gustavus Adolphus College in Biology and Peace Studies, assisted the President of the Shuar Organization as an advisor in the Ecuadorian Amazon in petroleum monitoring activities and eventually he became a writer/director. His documentary Esmeraldas: Petroleum and Poverty won the 2003 International Human Rights Award at the Media That Matters Film Festival. He also wrote and directed the music videos SAN and Kumal for an Indonesian rock band.
Joshua Holst has found a passion for the people of Indonesia. The devastating tsunami catastrophe of 2004 made Aceh once more to an international hot spot. Holst dedicated a website (a9media.com) to Aceh’s struggle. Enough reasons for us to speak with him about EXXON, filmmaking and aid abuse:
V: When did it first come into your mind to create a9media.com?
Holst: A man I met in Sumatra showed me a strange pattern of scars on his arms, abdomen and legs. He had been marked by the military; if they saw him again they would kill him. He wanted to go on film speaking about human rights abuses in Aceh, but he was afraid the military would find him and perhaps murder his family. I want so badly to use my medium—film—in conjunction with the internet to tell the international community what this man cannot.
The site was the product of sheer generosity. A festival coordinator who had seen my previous films and was interested my latest cause connected me to her friend, Ari Moore, who designed the site pro bono.
V: I have read your introduction to filmmaking was in 1999 on a delegation to the war zone of Chiapas. Can you tell us something about this experience?
 Holst: I was working on my thesis about the war in Chiapas, zooming through the Lancandon Rainforest at 3am-- because we had to run the remote military blockades at 5am in order to get to the locked-down indigenous communities--with a driver who was only crazy enough to do it because his brother had been murdered by the military, when we collided with a pothole the size of a minivan on a mountain ridge and ripped the wheel off our axle. Stranded in the middle of the rainforest, we hitched a ride with a government worker by pretending to be tourists (luckily he wasn't a bandit), and I rode in the back of the truck with Adam Werbach, former President of the Sierra Club and host of a TV show called "The Thin Green Line." So we bonded while bouncing around in the back of a truck at 3am. He was filming a segment on Chiapas and got me involved. He said, "If you ever decide to come to San Francisco, I've got a job for you." And a year or so later, I took him up on the offer. Before I was 22, I never would have imagined I would even want to be doing films, not once! Its weird how life takes you one direction or the other.
V: What is the reason for you to do all this?
Holst: (joking) I’m nuts. The investment banking class was too early in the morning so I took “Get Shot Working on a Documentary 101” instead. Oh, and I have access to loan money.
V: Can you give us a short historical background of Aceh’s conflicts?
Holst: Aceh has been in conflict since before Indonesia existed. The islands that make up present day Indonesia were once a series of colonies, within each colony thousands of languages and ethnic identities. Soekarno-Hatta, Indonesia’s first President was able to unite Indonesia with the promise that Indonesia would not be exploited for its resources and driven deeper into poverty as the other decolonized countries had become. Resisting Western corporate interest didn’t last long, as the brutal military dictator Suharto overthrew universally loved Soekarno-Hatta. Western media portrayed this as a good step for Indonesia until they discovered the mass exterminations, and debacles such as the massacres in East Timor were brought to light. Aceh was relatively ignored in the media, but they experienced identical repression to the East Timorese. Some suggest that the Acehnese are ignored in the western media because they are predominantly Islamic, while the East Timorese are Catholic. Suharto has since been overthrown and a democracy installed, but problems in Aceh have actually worsened.
Soekarno-Hatta’s pledge to protect Indonesia’s resources parallels the roots of the Acehnese conflict: Aceh is one of Indonesia’s wealthiest provinces—oil and gas revenues alone are 2 billion a year—but the poverty rate is 40%, child malnutrition is at a similar level. The Acehnese, who have their own language, culture and identity, do not benefit from the exploitation of their resources, while western companies such as ExxonMobil boast massive profits. This is further complicated by the fact that locally, resources are managed from Jakarta, on the island of Java. The Javanese control the government, manage Aceh’s resources, and have been part of a campaign to homestead Aceh with poor Javanese farmers while the military wipes out the Acehnese villagers as collateral damage in their “war on terror” in Aceh. Those Acehnese who are able to escape Aceh are faced with overt discrimination, widely considered terrorists because of their language and appearance. They hide, 4 to a closet, in constant fear of being picked up by the police and forced into an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp, where they are virtually prisoners. Political refugees to Malaysia are thrown in jail where they are stripped to their underwear and denied clothes and blankets, then caned before being returned to Aceh.
 The largely Javanese military is motivated not only by Javanese racial expansion, but also by military business. 70% of the military budget comes from private businesses, a large chunk of this from ExxonMobil. Some have suggested that attacks staged on the refinery are not guerrilla forces but plain clothes military hoping to increase the value of the military’s contract with ExxonMobil. Meanwhile, in the course of protecting the refinery, the military has killed countless civilians, kidnapped girls and raped them on the premises, and at one point used Mobil Oil’s earth moving equipment to bury 150 massacre victims—50 of whom were students—near one of the oil wells.
V: Was there any resistance against the military?
Holst: Anyone who speaks out against the military is in danger. If they don’t find you, they take your family. Advocates for rape victims have been assassinated. A protest against military brutality with women and children a few miles from ExxonMobil’s facilities ended in a military assault with men in a tank gunning down screaming protesters.
Needless to say, in this context support for the rebels has been strong. ASNLF or GAM has been active in recent years. Prior to the tsunami, an estimated 70%-80% of the ethnic Acehnese supported GAM ideologically, despite a lack of democratic structure within GAM. To its credit, one of GAM’s primary demands was the right to form local political parties. GAM was largely unsuccessful: elderly GAM negotiators were jailed, beaten, and charged with treason on their way to the Kyoto talks. Militarily, an estimated 4,000 GAM fought against an estimated 40,000 Indonesian military. The military inflicted 90% of the casualties since 2003 (though the bulk of those may have been civilians), and GAM was disproportionately affected by the tsunami.
V: In 2005 a peace agreement was made. What is the current situation in Aceh?
Holst: The tsunami decimated Aceh, 1 in 4 dead. The military was in complete control of nearly all the tsunami aid. For years they had been dumping food and clothes onto the ground at the border to isolate communities with a GAM presence. After the tsunami, they refused any aid to Aceh for several days, until they learned how they could profit from it. Aid was distributed selectively to areas under strict military control and primarily distributed to the military and pro-military militias first. While GAM declared a unilateral ceasefire, the military continued to hunt them down and shoot them for nearly a month.
V: How do the Acehnese feel about it?
Holst: The Acehnese are certainly relieved the fighting is over, however there are considerable concerns about its viability. Personally, I believe conditions will be much worse for the Acehnese post-tsunami, and fighting will resume within 5-10 years. The peace agreement was made with the Indonesians making virtually no concessions—in fact GAM lost quite a bit in the negotiations. Nothing has been done to alleviate the desperation and discontent of the Achenese, and there have been no democratic reforms.
One of the more troubling parts of the agreement was that Javanese Islamist groups have been allowed to set up shop in Aceh. Aceh as a reputation for being devoutly religious, however the media suggestion that Aceh is a breeding ground for fundamentalist terrorism is absolutely false. Java, on the other hand, has produced a significant number of terrorists, including the architect of the Bali bombing several years ago. Secular Acehnese are very concerned about the impact of installing an Indonesian Nationalist Jihadist sect of Islam in Aceh.
 V: The media is ignoring the facts of aid abuse and the military action. Hardly anything is reported about the situation in Aceh. What do you think is the reason for that?
Holst: I really couldn’t tell you for sure why, as I don’t work for a news agency. I can tell you that the abysmal gap between reality and what’s on the American news media is absolutely terrifying to me, because people in my country actually believe what they see on TV. It does a lot to explain US politics, however. And I’m still wondering. When a US nurse and a Scottish PhD working in Australia were jailed for treating civilian victims and recording human rights abuses, it was all over the BBC. They were kept in windowless cell next to an interrogation room where they heard and witnessed endless brutal beatings. The nurse had AIDS and became very sick, and was unable to procure care. But I think I missed that story here on FOX. How about you? They were probably too busy trying to “debate” WMD for weeks on end. More recently, William Nessen, a US reporter was in GAM territory in March of 2003 when the military operation began. He tried to get out, but the military kept shooting at him. Two Acehnese died getting him safely to the military who then jailed him for a month until he was able to buy his way out. But none of his stories made it into the news.
V: The foreign multinational corporation ExxonMobil exercises huge influence in Aceh. What kind of influence? And what do people of Aceh think about them?
Holst: I got into this a little bit in #4. It’s hard to say how ExxonMobil uses its influence behind closed doors. It’s important to note that the first thing Suharto did upon coming to power was auction off Indonesia’s resources to the Western interests that supported his coup; it’s possible that ExxonMobile fears renegotiating or even loosing its contract with the local Acehnese.
Aside from the rape victims and the 150 people buried on ExxonMobil’s property, a lawyer named Jaffar Siddiq Hamzah received anonymous death threats when he began research on taking a case against ExxonMobil for human rights abuses in the US courts. Shortly thereafter he was found in a ditch, mutilated and wrapped in barbwire.
It’s hard to say if the military is at the mercy of ExxonMobil, or ExxonMobil is at the mercy of the military, but with 2 billion dollars in oil and gas revenues, you can bet ExxonMobil has the potential to wield great influence in Aceh. I believe they could do very positive things if motivated to do so. As a company, it cannot be expected to act against its economic best interest; however as US citizens we can tie economic self-interest to peace, security and respect for human rights in Aceh.
V: And GAM’s opinion about Exxon?
Holst: GAM is quick to say that they “love” ExxonMobil. I think fear might be a better word. But they see ExxonMobil as the promise of funds for modernity. Presently there isn’t so much as a single escalator in all of Aceh. They do have some of the best scuba diving in the world, but the grass is always greener on the other side.
The general population has a less favorable opinion of ExxonMobil, especially those who live near the ExxonMobil’s operations. Many have family members who have been killed for walking too close, etc. The locals call the military stationed there Exxon’s Army. That’s the working title of my current film.
V: Apart from the influence of multinational corporations the people of Aceh have to cope with natural disasters, government corruption and religious conflicts. How would you describe their situation?
Holst: Luckily, Aceh has been relatively (and I mean relatively) free of religious conflicts. Churches have been virtually untouched in the conflict. That may change with the peace accords, as Javanese Indonesian Nationalist Jihadist Islamic sects establish themselves in Aceh. The government corruption and national disasters tie into the problem--reconstruction after natural disasters favors the wealthy, and in this case is likely to favor military business. This, combined with government corruption is all a part of the larger objective of consolidating power and control over Aceh and it’s oil and gas reserves. It’s clear that democratic reforms would solve a sweeping array of problems.
V: The abuse of aid money in Aceh sounds like one of those worst-case scenarios concerning relief help. Do you support the idea of binding standards or some sort of control for NGOs? Or is the Indonesian military the one to be called to account?
Holst: I think we should all be responsible for what happens to aid money. While this is an extreme case, this isn’t the first time aid has been used for political gain, and it won’t be the last. The more sophisticated organizations tend to be those that are least interested in the wellbeing of local people, but he most effective in conveying professionalism, and acquiring funds. We need to become willing to support local organizations, or international organizations that partner with local organizations in the distribution of aid. While not all small organizations can be trusted, there are a handful of organizations that had managed to work the system and deliver aid outside of military control. Larger agencies should consider re-granting in cases like this. Individuals should do their homework before donating.
V: Which NGOs are operating in Aceh?
Holst: Post-tsunami: quite a few. Some corrupt, some not. Some effective, some not. One of the best is CAFOD, a Catholic organization based in the UK.
V: Would the situation have improved if Western world had cut aids, knowing most of it has been given to corrupt people?
Holst: Hard to say. People were and are in dire need. I think wise giving is a better option. The Malaysian navy collected food and clothes from Mosques. When the Indonesians required that they unload it in one of their warehouses, the Malaysians refused, knowing that it would never get to anyone. They argued with the Indonesians, threatening to return home and tell the community that the Indonesians didn’t want any aid at all. Finally the Indonesians agreed to allow the Malaysians to distribute the goods themselves along the coast so long as they stamped “Property of the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lampur” on all their goods.
V: Did the US government do something about it?
Holst: If the US government had put pressure on the Indonesian government to allow outside organizations to control aid distribution, things might have been very different. Instead, the US was complicit. In fact, they re-established military aid to Indonesia for the first time since aid was cut during the abuses in East Timor over 20 years ago. Military aid could have been used as a lever to acquire human rights assurances, equitable aid distribution and a whole host of other reforms, but it wasn’t. Europe’s policy toward Indonesia has been equally permissive. My opinion: If you want to give aid, great. Please do. But if you REALLY want to help, you need to vote, organize your friends, and write letters to your respective government. And that’s free.
V: Once again Indonesia has become a victim of a tsunami. Do you think history is repeating itself?
 Holst: As I’m not in Indonesia right now, I can only speculate, but I would say that the dynamics of this disaster are going to be VERY different. The wave hit Java, not a conflict zone. It will be like comparing FEMA’s response in Florida and New Orleans, but on a much larger scale.
V: Back to your filmmaking. What lessons have you learned as filmmaker working in places like in costal Ecuador and Indonesia?
Holst: I've learned a lot for working in Ecuador and Indonesia. First off, for the kind of films I make, filmmaking is a team effort, and the best films are made with the support and insight of the people you are trying to help, whose lives you are trying to capture. I've always gotten guidance, direction and amazing stock footage from my friends in the community. What lesson haven't I learned? There are so many incredible experiences that happen off camera (spontaneous funeral singing in a stairwell-- I would have felt wrong to film it though), I have no idea how to capture those. Also, I'm good at winning awards, but I need to learn how to attract investors.
V: How do you approach the idea for a new project?
Holst: Man, there are so many amazing stories out there! From my experience, real life is so dramatic and incredible that the most action-packed mainstream movies seem mundane. When I hear a story that needs to be told, I don't stop until I've successfully done it, even if it takes years. I pour a lot of my own resources into my films, so I try to be careful about which stories I choose to attempt to tell, I try especially to think about if an American audience can benefit the film subjects. It's exhausting to make these things, and that responsibility helps drive me to the finish.
V: What is your next project? Can you tell us anything about it?
Holst: I still have a long way to go on this project, Exxon’s Army. I need to finish the edit, maybe acquire funds to do some more filming, resolve rights issues. That said I’ve got my eye on two side collaborations in Africa.
|
|
|